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Supporting Critical Modes in AirTight
J. Harbin, D. Griffin, A. Burns, I. Bate, R.I. Davis and L.S. Indrusiak
Department of Computer Science, University of York, UK.
Abstract—The AirTight protocol supports mixed criticality
wireless traffic and temporal guarantees based on defined fault
models. In some systems, following a catastrophic failure, it is
necessary to communicate crucial data away from the site of
the failure in order to better understand (post-hoc) the reasons
why it occurred. To support this action it is necessary for a
mode change request to be propagated to all the non-failed
nodes in the system, and for these nodes to switch their
behaviour so that the crucial data is given high priority in its
use of the wireless network. This paper explains how AirTight
can support such a critical mode change. A uni-cast protocol is
utilised to flood the system with mode change messages, each
node then locally prioritizes its use of the available bandwidth
to support the defined UC (Ultra-Criticality) packet flows. An
aircraft engine control scenario is used to motivate the
requirements for the mode change protocol. Protocol-accurate
simulations are then used to illustrate and evaluate the
approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
AirTight [2] is a wireless protocol (built upon the physical
and MAC layers of IEEE 802.15.4) that supports
mixed-criticality real-time traffic between computational
nodes. With any wireless communication it is not realistic to
assume fault-free behaviour. Rather, as in other
considerations of fault tolerance, we require that certain
levels of performance are delivered when the likelihood and
severity of faults is bounded by what is referred to as a fault
model. We assume that the physical layer of the protocol
incorporates the usual methods of increasing resilience (for
example spectrum spreading), AirTight therefore supports
analysis that models the faults that manifest themselves as
unacknowledged frame transmissions at the MAC layer.
Within AirTight the run-time behaviour is controlled via
two-level scheduling. A system-wide slot table determines
when each node can transmit and when each node must be
open to receive (and on which channel). Local to each node
is a fixed-priority scheduler that determines which packets to
transmit when it has a transmission slot. An application
packet (or flow) consists of a small sequence of frames; and
it is assigned a criticality level [3]. As frames are transmitted
each node keeps a count of the number of its transmission
failures. When this number is below a defined limit, frames
are simply resent. But if this limit is reached, a local
critically mode change is made at the node and only the
more critical packets are transmitted.
With a system defined to have two criticality levels, HI
and LO, response-time analysis is used to verify that all
packet deadlines are met if a lower threshold on the number
of faults is satisfied. If this threshold is violated but a higher
threshold is satisfied then the analysis will establish that all
HI-critical packets are delivered by their deadlines. When
there are currently no further frames to transmit then the
node’s failure count is re-set to zero.
In this paper we extend the scope for AirTight by defining
the required behaviour of each node when there are more
faults than the higher threshold specified, or when there is a
functional mode change to the entire system brought about
by a severe failure or attack. Although AirTight is a uni-cast
protocol it uses a flooding scheme to communicate the
requirement for this mode change to all non-failed nodes in
the system. Each of these nodes then switches its local
criticality mode to Ultra-Critical, UC. This will impact the
set of local tasks that are executed and on the set of packets
that are communicated. Within the context of the
experienced failure, these tasks and packets may be ‘new’
(i.e. only occur in this UC mode), be existing HI-criticality
tasks/packets or even be LO-criticality tasks/packets that
have increased significance in the new mode.
II. ENGINE MALFUNCTION USE CASE
An aircraft engine is a harsh environment for electronics
and wireless communication in that there are a lot of moving
mechanical parts generating both interference and attenuating
radio signals. Nevertheless, wireless sensors have two
distinct advantages: (1) the sensors can be put deep inside
the engine where it is not feasible to have cabling; and (2) it
removes the weight and maintenance of cabling. The
difficulty of maintenance may also mean that the designer
may want to fit a number of replicas so replacement is not
necessary. Current engines have a number of sensors. With a
shift towards more intelligent control and monitoring, this
number will grow. Internal to the engine there are failures
that may affect the wireless communications but also may
affect the requirements of the system. For example, in the
case of a shaft break, there will be a significant amount of
mechanical damage, which may cause nodes to fail and may
lead to large pieces of material (including metal) being in
unanticipated positions.
External to the engine there are a number of controlled
interference sources, e.g. from the rest of the aircraft, and
un-controlled interference sources, e.g. high-intensity
radiated fields including lightning, mobile phones, laptops
etc. This leads to complex fault behaviour that cannot be
fully defined at design time. We therefore utilise a collection
of fault models (one per criticality level) that are, in
themselves, bounded. Finally, a number of parts of the
overall aircraft system (and logistical support equipment on
the ground) may want to use wireless communications and
as such the aircraft engine should be designed to share the
same parts of the spectrum especially as the whole aircraft
could have hundreds if not thousands of sensors.
A good example of the potential deployment of a wireless
communication media is within an aircraft engine for the
purposes of active health monitoring [4]. Figure 1 shows the
communication graph (black lines) for a 25-node wireless
network inspired by a possible engine monitoring system; it
is clear that the topology of this example is a 5-node
subsystem repeated 5 times. Actual data flows are shown as
blue arrows. While this may not entirely represent how
aircraft engines will ultimately use wireless communications,
it is representative. An aircraft engine has a limited amount
of space available to mount wireless sensors. In these places
there are opportunities to use energy harvesting, e.g. using
vibration, to power the nodes. Therefore in these locations
there will be a number of smart sensors (i.e. nodes)
monitoring different properties of the engine which will then
communicate with the rest of the engine via a signal
concentrator. Then, in one central location there will be the
traditional aircraft engine controls system (termed a FADEC
– Full Authority Digital Control system) that takes all the
signals, provides the primary control and monitoring, and
importantly provides the links to the Avionics Full-Duplex
Switched Ethernet (AFDX), i.e. the communications to the
rest of the aircraft.
We have used this 5-node subsystem to illustrate the
analysis associated with AirTight [2], and have validated this
analysis using a prototype network of 5 IEEE 802.15.4
compliant nodes. We also used a protocol-accurate in-house
simulator to evaluate AirTight’s performance and scalability
over the complete 25-node network. In total this network has
55 packet flows mapped to the 25 nodes; 25 of these flows
are defined to be of HI-criticality and 30 of LO-criticality.
In this paper we will use this example to illustrated how
AirTight supports the need for the criticality mode change
that would follow a significant mechanical failure, e.g. a
shaft break. A shaft break (or similar catastrophic failure) is
a very rare but not unknown event1. It is an interesting
example within the context of this work for two reasons.
Firstly, as the engine is effectively damaged beyond repair
then this event is rarely, and certainly not comprehensively,
investigated on a test rig which means if/when it does
happen for real there is a strong desire to get as much
engine data as possible into long-term storage for later
diagnosis and understanding. Secondly, from the point at
which the shaft break is detected, more complex control
algorithms are performed for a limited amount of time but
this extra functionality can be at the expense of some of the
“normal” functionality including that which is normally
HI-criticality. For these reasons, the shaft break mode change
can be modelled as follows: (i) the amount of data being
communicated from the smart sensors to long-term storage is
1An example is reported in https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/airplane-
mode/faa-orders-a380-engine-inspections-after-midair-failure-emergency-
landing-n810341.
increased by a factor of, perhaps, 5; (ii) the time for which
the best-effort communications must be maintained is, for
example, 20 seconds; (iii) a percentage of nodes will be
randomly lost, e.g. 10%; (iv) as some nodes may be lost,
including those responsible for signal concentration and
communications to the airframe, some signals may need to
be sent to a number of sinks instead of just one; and (v) a
percentage of the “normal” HI-criticality messages will
become LO-criticality, e.g. 50%.
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Fig. 1. Communication Graph of a 25 node Health Monitoring System
III. OVERVIEW OF AIRTIGHT
We assume a distributed system of nodes that can each
perform any combination of executing tasks, producing/
consuming data from sensors/tasks, writing to actuators and
relaying data packets to and from other nodes. The AirTight
protocol has the following basic properties (most of them
inherited from the parent standard IEEE 802.15.4):
• Peer-to-peer packet-switching communication between
tasks/nodes is the normal use of the network. Packets
are sent as one or more frames. Each successful frame
transmission is always acknowledged by the receiver
through the transmission of a short ACK frame.
• Multi-hop routing is required due to the limited
transmission range of each node.
• Buffers exist on each node to store frames in transit
(the size of the buffers required on each node can be
determined during the offline schedulability analysis).
• Nodes have line power or local harvesting, so energy
efficiency/battery life is not a limiting concern.
• Multiple frequency bands (channels) are available in
IEEE 802.15.4 (up to 16 in the 2.4GHz band) but a
node can only use one channel at a time.
• Node communications are represented by two graphs: the
communications graph and the interference graph:
– The communications graph C: if there is an edge
from A → B in C, then the two nodes can
communicate directly. This is required to be a
symmetric graph due to the necessity for an
acknowledgement to be returned to the sender, so
A → B implies B → A.
– The interference graph I: if there is an edge from
A → B in I, then a transmission from A will prevent
B from receiving a frame from any node other than
A on that channel at that time.
Note C is a subgraph of I: if A → B is in C then it will also
be in I.
It is assumed that the packets to be communicated have tight
timing constraints (i.e. deadlines). We also require that the
system supports applications of different levels of criticality.
AirTight is designed to balance efficiency and flexibility.
At the system level, its media access control is table-driven,
but at the node level it uses criticality-aware priority-based
frame scheduling. The protocol is based around the repeated
application of the slot tables which, in time, define the
activities of each node – either transmission or reception on
that channel, or null meaning no usage. The slot (or
scheduling) table (ST) consists of a series of slots. Each slot
is assigned to a node and can be used by that node to send a
single data frame on a designated channel. The slot also
accommodates the ACK frame of the respective receiver.
At each node, local scheduling decisions are made to
manage the use of the node’s slot allocation. We employ a
fixed-priority scheme. A set of FIFO queues (buffers), one
per priority level, are used to hold the frames that need to be
transmitted. Each normal flow has a unique priority and
hence a specific buffer. The frames from the same flow are
stored in the buffer in FIFO order. Whenever the node has a
slot available, it transmits the first frame in the highest
priority non-empty buffer. If an ACK is received the frame is
removed from the buffer; if no ACK is received, then the
frame remains in the buffer and is a candidate for
re-transmission when the next available slot for that node
becomes available.
AirTight is thus a two level protocol. A collection of slot
tables defines the usage of the wireless media. Each slot in a
table defines whether the node can transmit in that slot (and on
which channel if more than one channel is used), or whether
it should listen in that slot (and on which channel), or whether
it is off-duty. The collection of tables reflects the properties
of the communication and interference graphs.
The fundamental time unit of AirTight is the duration (S)
of a slot – the time it takes to communicate a single frame
of data and receive an ACK for that frame. In our prototype
implementation [2] a slot length of 10ms has been achieved.
All parameters of the application, the communication media
and the environment (e.g. the usual Ti, Ci, Di, table length,
fault models, etc.) are expressed as an integer number of slot
times.
A schedulable AirTight network supporting mode changes
is intended to support the following requirements:
• If there are no faults experienced by the system then all
packets will meet their deadlines.
• If the faults experienced by the system are no worse than
that implied by the LO-criticality fault model then all
packets will meet their deadlines. This is defined to be
the LO-criticality mode.
• If the faults experienced by the system are no worse
than that implied by the HI-criticality fault model then
all HI-criticality packets will meet their deadlines. This
is defined to be the HI-criticality mode.
• If the faults experienced by the system are worse than that
implied by the HI-criticality fault model then we assume
that this level of faults implies a permanent degradation
to the network and/or the control system it is supporting.
This is defined to be the Ultra-Critical (UC) mode, and
is the focus of this paper.
For this mixed-criticality behaviour response-time analysis
has been developed [2] that can be used to verify an
application. This analysis is itself based upon the approach
developed for mixed criticality task scheduling [1]; it is not
repeated here due to space limitations.
The application’s characteristics, together with the per
channel interference and communication graphs, and the
analysis developed for AirTight, are the inputs required to
construct the per channel slot tables. The simplest slot table
is one that has a single slot per node (with some slots being
used by more than one node if they are not linked in the
interference graph). More complex slot tables can be
constructed, via search techniques such as the use of Genetic
Algorithms that also take task placement and routing into
account. The use of these techniques to construct optimal, or
near optimal, slot tables forms part of future work and is not
considered further here.
IV. SUPPORTING CRITICAL MODE CHANGES
For ease of presentation we will assume that our system is
multi-hop and multi-domain, but single channel.
In the LO- or HI-criticality (i.e. not UC) mode of
operations each node (ni) will have a set of other nodes that
it sends messages to. Let this set be represented by Pi (for
partners). Clearly each member of Pi is linked to ni in the
communication graph, C. Let the larger set of nodes that ni
could communicate with be denoted by P+i . So P
+
i contains
all the partners of ni in C.
A mode change is triggered within ni by either an
application task that has identified a severe physical failure,
or attack, or the AirTight protocol stack having monitored
more frame communication failures than can be tolerated in
the HI-criticality mode; let this value be represented by
GHI . Node ni also undergoes a mode change if it receives
an authenticated ‘mode-change’ packet from another node.
This packet is then passed on to all members of P+i .
In the protocol described in this paper, the slot table does
not change when the node switches to the UC mode. It is
possible to envisage a protocol in which a different slot table
becomes more appropriate in the UC mode. But to
coordinate the simultaneous switching of all nodes to a new
table is not without considerable difficulty. We therefore
explore in this work the expressive power of an approach
that retains the same slot table in this UC mode. This has
the advantage that the mode change can be communicated
across the system without the need for coordination. Of
course the initial (offline) construction of the slot table could
take into account the needs of the UC mode. For example, a
node that does not transmit any packets under normal
operation, and hence does not require a slot in the table,
could be assigned a slot so that it could contribute to the
communication of the critical mode change request.
Having recognised the need for a system-wide mode change
the node follows the following (initial phase) protocol:
• A single ‘mode-change’ packet of the highest local
priority is queued (buffered) ready to be sent to all
members of P+i . A distribution queue is initialised,
containing the members of P+i . This distribution queue
may optionally be sorted in such a way as to direct the
mode change message more quickly in a specific
direction.
• When transmitting the packet, its next-hop destination is
set to the node at the head of the distribution queue. If
the transmission is acknowledged successfully, the entry
at the head of the distribution queue is removed. If the
distribution queue is empty, then all peers have been
informed of the mode change, and the mode change
packet is deleted from its buffer.
• If a frame from one of these packets fails to be
acknowledged then the associated packet is not removed
from the buffer – this is the usual behaviour for
AirTight.
• If any frame fails to be sent to the same next-hop
destination GHI times (determined by the lack of an
acknowledgement), the next-hop destination is removed
from the distribution queue – the wireless link or
designated node is assumed to be permanently broken
as a result of the primary cause of the mode change.
• If node ni receives a ‘mode-change’ packet from nj
while it is already distributing its mode change, then nj
is removed from the distribution queue (if it is currently
present) – clearly nj does not need to be informed of
the mode change.
The above flooding behaviour ensures that all non-failed nodes
receive the mode change request within a bounded period of
time. The analysis developed for AirTight [2] can be used to
compute this value for various system failure scenarios (an
example is provided in the Evaluation section).
In the second phase of the protocol the packets associated
with the UC mode are queued and transmitted. These packets
arise from:
• Packets that are only sent in the UC mode (perhaps
emanating from local tasks that only execute in the UC
mode).
• HI-criticality packets that are relevant to UC mode;
perhaps with an increased number of frames and/or
alternative routes.
• LO-criticality packets that are relevant to UC mode;
perhaps with an increased number of frames and/or
alternative routes.
• UC packets that originate from other nodes and are being
routed through this node.
All UC packets are transmitted with a priority higher than
those used for the usual HI-criticality and LO-critically traffic.
It is assumed that there is a finite number of packets to be
communicated within the UC mode. Perhaps a single packet
per originating task (i.e. these tasks are single-shot rather than
recurrent). Analysis can again be used to determine how long
it will take for such flows to reach their destinations when
there are parts of the network unavailable and faults being
experienced in the operational parts. Of course if the network
is partitioned then it will not be possible to deliver the UC
packets unless each partition has a relevant sink.
In the UC mode if there are currently no UC packets to
transmit then other HI-criticality packets can be sent. They
would have lower priority and hence would not interfere
with newly arrived UC packets (from either the host node or
being forwarded from other nodes); in general they would
not however be guaranteed to arrive before their deadlines. It
is assumed that LO-criticality packets, other than those
promoted to UC, are not transmitted in the UC mode.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we consider the evaluation of the AirTight
ultra-criticality mode change via simulation. The simulator is a
discrete event simulation which allows analysis of the latencies
of packet flows, and transmission of the mode change. It allows
various faults to be defined with different probabilities and
locations affected, and individual nodes to be disabled during
simulation. The simulator also supports GUI visualisation of
the network in the process of simulation, indicating the status
of the nodes and their transmission buffers.
In order to evaluate the performance of the protocol, it is
important to consider the length of time taken to deliver the
UC mode change packet throughout the network, and the UC
packets. In addition, we can also assess the impact upon the
delivery rates and deadlines of the originally present HI-critical
and LO-critical packets.
The case study described in Section II and our previous
AirTight work [2] is used for the evaluation.
The slot table size used in this example case study is 30,
which is equivalent to 5 copies of the 6-slot table used in
[2]. The example topology is shown in Figure 1. The
topology has been modified from that used in [2] by the
addition of a number of additional links from nodes 9 to 4,
14 to 2, 19 to 1 and 24 to 3 (and since links are symmetric,
the reverse). This provides additional redundancy which is
required for providing fault tolerance in the event of a shaft
break failure disconnecting the original primary wireless link.
The fault case selected for the experimental case study
models a shaft break event occurring in the upper right
section of the topology. Its effects upon the network are as
illustrated in Figure 2. Nodes 8 and 6 fail permanently and
the link from node 9 to node 3 is permanently disconnected.
This loss of nodes fits with the requirements for the mode
change in the aircraft case, in that a small proportion of the
network nodes and connection links are lost as a result of
the failure. The transmission of the UC mode change is
initiated by node 5, which is informed of the shaft break by
a reading from one of its directly connected sensors. Upon
entering UC mode, nodes 5, 7, 10, 15 and 20 begin
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Fig. 2. Effects of the fault on the network (only the affected section shown)
executing a special processing task to gather logging data
about the shaft break failure. When this task completes,
these nodes transmit UC traffic – a data flow destined for
node 0 for the central module to convey the logged data.
In an emergency situation, it is important for the mode
change to be propagated across the network rapidly. The
time taken from the mode change event occurring to the
notification propagating across the network is considered in
this section. For each case, two metrics are used: the time
for the central node which has the wired link to the rest of
the network (identified as node 0) to be notified, and the
time for every node in the network to be notified. During the
flood propagation, the network is subject to different levels
of unrelated ‘normal’ faults, which manifest in a given
probability of a transmission failing. This probability is
uniform across the network, regardless of location. The
length of these fault bursts is increased in the series of
experiments performed.
The role of the simulator is to enable different scenarios
and fault models to be explored. Clearly this is much easier
to do with a simulator than a test-bed. One of the options
available with the simulator is to either simulate worst-case
fault behaviour, or to model fault arrivals via various
stochastic processes. Another choice is whether to assume
that each ‘link’ in the wireless network has dependent or
independent faults. For dependent behaviour a fault hits all
links at the same time - thus a routed message will perhaps
only suffer interference from faults on one of its hops. With
independent faults each hop could suffer this interference.
In the following examples of runs of the simulator we first
force the faults to occur at the ‘worst possible time’ but
assume faults are dependent. We then consider independent
but stochastically modeled faults.
Figure 3 demonstrates the increasing time taken for the
distribution of the mode change with increasing length of
transient faults. In all experiments time is measured in
numbers of slots.
For this experiment, the probability of transmitted data
packets being interfered with during the fault interval is
100% - it is assumed, for a worst case, that the transient
fault is completely destructive of ongoing traffic. Obviously,
the time taken to inform the central node 0 is lower than the
time taken to inform every node within the network. It is
notable that as the fault length is increased, several
discontinuities occur in which the elapsed time required to
propagate the mode change increases suddenly. These occur
as a result of the interaction between the periodic scheduling
table of AirTight and the fault definition.
In this experiment the distribution queues which control
the order for transmission of the mode change messages are
setup to direct the mode change messages towards the
central node 0. We found that this static property almost
halved the delivery time by comparison with an arbitrary
ordering of the distribution queues.
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Assuming the mode change in this case study represents
an aircraft engine shaft break, a number of actions would be
required in order to respond to the mode change. Firstly, we
would assume that the network node detecting and signalling
the mode change would have to perform some processing to
determine the nature and effects of the fault that triggered
the mode change. Then it would communicate with its
coordinator node 0, transmitting some UC traffic in order to
transmit additional data via a multi-hop route. Also, the
other central nodes from each of the functional regions
illustrated in Figure 1 (nodes 10, 15 and 20) would, on
receiving the communicated mode change, determine the
control effects which are necessary and then transmit the
relevant data back to node 0. Given that these
communication data flows could involve instructions to other
engines that detail how they would have to respond to
compensate, this would be transmitted at the highest priority
after the mode change itself.
We now consider the latencies involved in the transmission
of this ultra-criticality (UC) data traffic. Five UC data flows
are activated, referred to as UC1 to UC5.
Figure 4 shows the latencies experienced for the 5 UC data
flows, indicating the time following their injection into the
network for the complete packets to reach their destination at
node 0. It is assumed in Figure 4 that the processing delay to
generate UC traffic is very short, effectively less than a single
table, so the packets are ready to be transmitted and present in
the buffer the next time the source node has a transmission slot.
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Fig. 4. Latencies for UC data transmission
However, since UC flood packets (with the highest priority)
are present in the network, the generated UC data will not be
immediately transmitted.
The data series for the latency values is generated by
varying the transient fault length which occurs in the
network. These faults are assumed to begin immediately
upon the mode change, i.e. upon the injection of the UC
data traffic. The period of the faults is 500 slots, and the
faults are assumed to recur at the beginning of this interval,
network-wide (that is, all links in the network are affected
simultaneously).
Since flows UC1 and UC2 share a majority of the same
route, it is as expected that UC2 has a higher latency than
UC1. UC3 and UC4 have disjoint routes, so they do not
mutually interfere with each other, and achieve broadly the
same latency even though they have different injection times.
UC5 experiences the highest latencies since it may receive
interference from UC1 and UC2 (due to their requirement to
route via node 4).
We now show a result from simulating independent faults
that arrive stochastically. Clearly many different arrival
patterns can be experimented with. Faults hitting each link of
a routed message are likely to be rare; but should
nevertheless be investigated. In the following experiment
each link experiences a fault that arrives randomly between
the arrival of the UH mode change packet and that time plus
the table length. So this packet can potentially propagate
through the network without interference from faults but the
probability of it suffering multiple faults is not negligible.
Figure 5 shows a set of box plot results for increasing
durations of faults. For each fault duration 1000 simulations
were undertaken. Also shown on this figure is the analytical
upper bound calculated using the analysis reported in
previous work on AirTight [2]. Note, as expected, the
longest propagation time observed in the simulation
experiments is less than this bound.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a CPS system, a permanent fault may occur in such a way
as to require a different protocol response from those normally
assumed in the case of transient faults, such as retransmission
and alternative routes. Specifically, it may require a functional
mode change to be signalled throughout the network in order
to inform the entire system of an emergency situation, as well
as triggering the dropping of LO-criticality work. This paper
has demonstrated the modification of the AirTight protocol in
order to support these more challenging fault scenarios, with
only a minor modification of the logic for data distribution
at the highest priority level. The timing characteristics of this
mode change data and associated logging traffic have been
investigated via simulation to demonstrate its performance in
the presence of a variety of fault intensities.
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